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"'The Texas Community System".
APTLY T-FXAS HISTORY.
Py the Constitutive act of 1824 the Mexican states of
Coahuila and Texas were unitel. 'iradually disaffection arose
between the people of the two states, and in October, 1834 two
meetings were held in the state of Texas, one at San Antonio, and
the second at San Pelipe de Austin. Thie former (a convention),
was held for the purpose of organizing the people of Texas for the
protection of their rights, and at the second meeting a resolution
was passed recommending that te connection between Coahuila and
Texas be dissolved.
MJurmurings- of discontent were now continually heard, and
disaffection with the existing 7overnment !-raduailyIincreased.
At last a revolutionary convention was called, and on Hovember 'th,
1835 a declaration was made "reflusing to acknowledge the rights of
the existing authorities of the Mexican qovernment within the lim-
its of Texas ".
The Plan and Powers of the Provisional 'overnment of
Texas was adoj ted November l6th, 186:5. On I'arc'h 2nd, 1866, in a
general convention of delegates of the people of Texas, a formal
declaration of independence was male.
TIhe constitution of the Pepublic of Texas was adopted in
the same convention on M'Iarch l th, 186bo, and was ratified by the
people on tle first T,-onay in September, 18,. -y this consti-
tution it was provided: Congress, (Legislature of Texas), shall as
early as practicable introduce by statute, the common law of Tg-
land, with such modifications as our circumstances, in their judge-
ment may require; and in all criminal cases the common law shall
be the E-ule of decision. (Art. TV, sec. 165)
(By the Act of Congress Dec. !0, 1830, the common law of
"Enland, so far as it applied to juries and evidence, was adopted).
(By Act of congress, Dec. O, 1840, the conrnon law of
Tnglani, so far as not inconsistent with. thie constitution and the
acts of ongress, (of' Texas), then in force, was made the rule of
decision.)
On Dec. V9th, 1845i, Texas was admitted into the TTnion, in
anticip~ation of whiich she in the same year bad ado7 ted a new con-
stitution conforming to the change in the form of c@vernment.
constitutional
Such is a brief synopsis of theA history of a state whose system of
marital relations T am about to discuss.
Ori',in of the (7ommunity System.
At a very early period of the world's history wO find the
poor downtrodden classes gradualLy unit ing to form associations.
They thus improved and developed their condition of life, and in
,,he words of Laferri ro, hsuch association made th,.,m live and ;row
for better times".
These associations expanded into what is now known as the
Ancient Olommnunity, which according to M. Durpin, "formed a sort of
corporation or coilege--a civil person, like a monastery or bor-
ough, which is perpetual by the substitution of new constituent
members, without any change in the actual existence of the corror-
ation, eith er in its manner of lire or in the government of its
own affairs".
on
assin A by rapirl strides we soon reach the family com-
munity, which was the logical successor of the village communit,.
Such a community was an association for common defense and accor-
ding to Laveleye, cultivated its domain for the common prorit kni
lived at the corrnon expense. The ri 7lt of inh-eritance was based
not upon ties of blood but upon the life in common, and only ap.rli-
ed to relations living in community, whether collaterals or even
strangers admitted by adoption.
"The association of all the members of the family under
one roof, on one prorerty, with a vi,-w to joint labor an, joint
profits", says .. T-oI'J.ong, "is a general and cl-aracteristic fact
from the 2onttl of Fr'ance to its olosite extremities". (2 ommren-
taries sur les societies civiler, 'roface) 'emales were exciI,)d
from the inheritance of family communities in Slavonic countries,
in India, ragan '7reece and 'Rome, and even in countries wit':in the
pale of Christianity. ",11 y this exclusionr ,I. Fustpe le .I'oulan-
,es gives a6 a reason, the incalIaci~y of females to perform the
sacrifices. A better reason given is that te atriyimony of these
families, from which they derived their suj-,port, had to be preser-
ved intact. -ernaLes by marriage rassed into another family, and
if they were allowed to inherit t-ey would claim tTeir share, and
the destruction of ThTie Family corporation would thus be inevitable.
In ot er words, they were excluded from inheriting in order to
r'reservo the -ens, and th-.e indivisibiLity of the family property.
Such was the family community in its I'rimitive state, but "tempores
muTantur nos mutamur in illis".
Tn the family community we have, to my mind, the germ of
the system of acquits and gains. Vre see in that -Ole idea of form-
ing a primitive family, in which all the members are pro'rietors,
all co-equals in the cultivation of the land, and all stare alike
in the }'rofits. The essential element of the present community
system is, of course, wanting. The wife was not a sharer of the
prof its. The reason for this has been exIplained above. Hlow,
then, was this essential element engrafted uron this primitive
system? My only p'resumption in i'egard to this is, tI~at in zhotew
countries where the system oriinated the wife's position rradtallv
became of greater importance until at last she was recognized as
of equal importance to the h,,usband. Wlhen this idea began to pre-
vail, family communities dissolved into families, and the wife's
rosition being thus elevated, te inevitable conclusion must have
followe-I that the wife, by her industry and care, contiibutes
equally with her husband to the acquisition of property. 7hy then
should shie not share in the benefits?
Several Spanish writers cling to the idea that the Com-
mu-nity system originated with the Romans. This, T believe, is
entirely erroneous, for now1here and at no Ieriod of the Poman law
can we find a trace of this system or anything similar thereto.
At an early period of tlhe Poman law the wife's position was regu-
lated by the "Mvlanus". She fell under "the hand" of her husband,
and virtually became a mere member of lis family. On the death of
a patrician pater-fairiilias tlhe children inherited, his widow taking
an equal share with them.
From this extremely humble position the Roman law eleva-
ted the wife to its exact opposite. At this later period the
Roman marriage left the s-ouses almost entirely inderendent of
each ot',er. They had separate rights, and could each bold s era-
rate and distinct estates. TTnder this system of the civil law
the wife only inherited aft(lr the husband's kith and kin had been
exhausted and even then she only took in preference to the trea-
sur'y.
The only way then by which the community system couLd
have existed under the civil law was by a stipulation to thatr<F-
effect in the ante-nuptial contract between the Tarties, for, in
the more polished ares of Roman jurisprudence, th:e wife being
looked upon as a separate and distinct person from the husband,
could stipulate with him any agreement wh ich was to guide their
marital relations.
All the French writers are agreed that the system never
originated with the Poman law. They undoubtedly arrive at this
conclusion by noting that before the FrencT' Revolution, in the
Southern provinces where the Roman law prevailed, the marriage
contract was governed by the dotal system, whereas in the ,Northern
Irovinces which were inder the customary law, the community of
I-roperty governed the marital contract.4# The French O£ode gave
the prefere, ce to the latter system, for while it allowed the
1. Vent r'omm. 190.
/
contracting parties to elect between the Peime dotal and the p4 -
gime de la Communante, yet if no choice was made, tle latter sys-
ter irevailed.
Sir Henry Maine in his work on "Ancient Taw" says: "2IWith
the early Pomans, as with the hlindus andi the 'Treeks, marri-ge was
a religious luty. A duty a man owed alike to 'his ancestors and
Vimself. " This arpears to me to be another reason why the early
state of the CiviL law could never' have originated the community
system, for marriage by this system is and always has been a mere
life Fartnership between man and woman for th e common benefit of
botlh.
The later dotal system, it can readily be seen, bears
not the slightest resemblance to the system of acquits and gains.
From the foregoing premises t'he conclusion thierefore must follow,
that the rQommunio bonorum was never a part of the Poman law. Tf'
it was a rart of that law, it existed at an extremely early period,
and ceased long before the (ompilation of the Digest.
TTnder tIe Oommon law the wife's existence is merged in
t-at of the husband. Tn otler words, "the husband and wife are
one, and ti at one is the husband. " The wife is therefore not an
equal of the husband. The community system could therefore never
have originated with the Common law.
WNhence then lid it come? Tn those countries where this
system rrevailed, it was so ancient that no one has as yet been
able to say whlence it came, when it commenced, or how it was in-
traduced. Pven as the comrunity system is midway between that
of the common law, and its opposite <he civil law, so The origin
of tTat system is only to be traced to a country midway between the
original countries of the Common and of' the Civil law. After
careful reading and study T have come to the conclusion that only
one Ipresumption is to be entertained and that is, that the commun-
ity system is an outgrowth of the customary law of the 'ermanic
tribes. Caesar in his commentaries says that when the 'auls mar-
ried, the husband was held to put in common as much property as he
received from his wii'e; to makeof the whole a mass, which should
belong to the survivor of the two. While tlis is not the commun-
ity system, it undoubtedly embraces some of its ideas.
Troplong in hiis preface to Tis work "Du Oontrat de ,,'-
iage" says XCVTT :"ITt seems now to be the system of the countries
governed by the customary law. rhe invasion of the Franks had
renetrated in a most profound manner the countries conquered by the
i isigoths and th e Purgundians. Numerous bands of the Flrench had
occulied the soil, in great part deserte-. They created estab-
lishments in these countries, built fortifications, constructed
villages, and the 'ei'manic element T ad energetically p~reserved its
oriinality in te presence of the indigenous population, mucl a-
rer than in the qout'" (Free translation).
At a very early T eriod of the history of the 1ermans we
find that the wife took by positive law tle one-third (1/3), of all
the gains made durinw coverture. The care and industry of the
wife undoubtedly Iroduced this legislation, but in tl'is as in many
other notable instances, "t1he legislation survives long after cau-
ses which occasioned it, have ceased to exist."
Lowever  he system oripinated, we find that it prevailed
at a very early reriod in 7rance, .q1ain, Holland and Scotland, and
was carried by colonists to ( eylornauritiui, the Cape of 7ood
Ilope, guiana, Demarara and canada. TI was established by SIranish
colonists in La. and Mexico, and now exists, in a more or less mod-
ified form in the states of Tla. Tex. Cal. Uev. WNashinpton, Montana,
Idaho, Arizona, Dak., Mo., and the territories of i.w :Texico and
It ah.
The system as it exists in Scotland, is of a very limite31
character, and does riot extend to real property or subjects which
produce annual profits. The French law extends thie system merely
to personalty,. while in Spain, both real and personal property are
subject to it. The Community system, it can be readily seen, is
widely i'revalent, but T shall now confine myself to the system as
it exists in Texas.
17T qLAT TON ON TJ qTTJT7CT.
Tn ScheduLe Sec. I of the onstitUtion or the Pepubli, o,"
Texas, (186 ) we find the following: That no irconvenience may
arise from the adoption of this constitution, it is declared by
this Convention that all laws now in force in Texas, and not incon-
sistent with this Constitution, shall remain in full force, until
declared void, repealed, altered, or exi ire by their own limita-
tion.
The C onstitution of the State of Texas (1845), Art. VTT,
See. 19 piovides: "All proyerty both real and personal of the wife,
owned or claimed by her before marriage, and that acquired after-
wards by gift, devise or descent, shall be her separate property;
and laws shall be passed more clearly defining the rights of the
wife, in relation as well to ber separate property, as tlat held
in common with her husband. Taws s'hall also be passed providing
for' the registration of the wife's separate property". This -ame
provision is found in the Constitution of 1861 (Art. VTT sec. 19),
in the Constitution of 186o (Art. VTT sec. 19), and in the last
Constitution of 1876 (Art. XVT sec. 1i). The provision in the
Constitution of 1869 (Art. [VyT, sec. 14) is substantially the same
but worded slighitly different. Such is the only constitutional
provision to be found on the subject.
COMMTITTTY PPOI'PTY TWDNP.PF TJ[P SPA37TSI q"!TM
Before tl-.e adoption of the common law the marital rights
in Texas, were regulated and determined by the laws of spain.
1hat then was community property inder that system',
"2anancial prorerty is all that which is increased or
multi]rlied during marriage; by multiplied, bein;r understood all
that which is increased by onerous cause or title, and not by a
herative one, as inheritance or donation; that property is supposed
zo be common excert when proved to be separate or distinct; that
what the husband or wife bring into marriage as their own peculiar
dui- i n,-
property, or acquire it by lucrative cause or title, does not come
into partition; but that property acquired during marriage by pur-
chase, sale, or other onerous cause or title does". (Wite's
Pecopilacion, vol. 1 p. 61).
Tn the Novissima Pecop. (lib. 10 tit. 4 sec. I) we find
the following law: "Rverything which the husband or wife shall ac-
quire or purchlase while togethler, shall be equally divided between
them" etc .4
There is thus a strong presumption that all property ac-
1. (Toda cosa que el marilo'ymurer ganaren a compraon estando de
consumo hay aulo ambos per mcdio etc).
quired during the existence of the community beLongs to it. This
presumption can only be overcome by cei-tain and positive evidence,
and the burden of proof is thus always on the party claiming the
property as separate.
In Sala lib. I tit. 4 sec. 20, it is clearly laid down
that, "luring the continuance of' the marriage the actual dominion
over the comunity property is vested in the husband, and that
therefore he can sell the comTnunity rrol'erty without the consent
of the wife; and that such disposition is valid, except when made
for the purlose of defrauding or prejudicing the wife" (See Wfhite's
Recop. vol. I p. 63 with the note from Paiacios) Such were ulie
essential provisions of the Spanish Community system.
On January 20th, 1840, when the common law was adopted
by the state of Texas, an act was passed "defining the marital
rights of husband and wife". 'Thy this act the Spanish system was
substantially re-enacted on the Statute book of the new American
state of Texas. Tn 1848 an act was passed, "better d2fining the
marital rights". There were but few changes made in the SIanish
law, one of the most important being that the wife could now become
liable as sur6,ty for her husband. The substantial provisions ofT
tl ese two acts, and the substance of the leading cases construin l
th e i r
Arrovisions will constitute the basis of my furtlher remarks.
TI7 T77KAS COMi-ITNTnOPoHOPTq,,.
T. The Partnership Pelation.
The relation which exists between husband an- wife under this sys-
tem is virtually a partnership by which they agree to combine thei
property, labor and skill, and share alike in the profits. The
only property t"at is not primarily liable for partnership dob-ts
is that acquired by either party by )ift, devise or descent, such
property being the separate ProTerzy of either spouse.
A. THE 1ITSBAND' S TNT7PRTPST.
The husband, under this system, as under all systems of
marital relations, is the head of the family, and as such headuer-
are
tain rights and privileges allowed him with respect to the commun-
ity property. These are as follows:
(1) le has the active dominion and control over the community
property.
(2) He can alienate, exchange or dispose of it without the con-
sent of his matrimonial partner; and his acts, if not done with a
fraudulent intent to her injury, will be good.
(3) 'Le sells and purchases in his own name.
(4) Ie may encumber all real esthete of the community except the
homestead (Mabry v. Harrison, 44 Tex. 286.)
(o) - Conveyances as a rule, are taken in his name but they may
be taken in the joint name of himself and wife, or in her name
alone.
"No doctrine is better settled", says ch. J. '7Teeler in
Iitchell v. Mlarr 26 T., 630, "than that property ruvchased during
a marriag e, whethier the conveyance be taken in the name of tfLa
husband or of the wife, or in the joint names of both prima fa-
cia belongs to the corrnunity".
This Iresumption may, however, be rebutted: (a) Bly
clear and satisfactory proof that the purchase was made with the
separate funds of either husband or wife, in which case it remains
the separate Iroperty of tle party whose money was employed in its
acquisition#. (b) Ty proof that the husband declared at the
time that his intention in taking the deed in his wife's name was
to make the land her separate property. Tn such cases the trans-
action operates as a gift from the husband to the wife. Thus it
was held in Iartwell v. Jackson / T. oi, that the husband may make
a valid bill of sale or deed of gift to his wife, which will be
enforced against his Theirs.
Tt seems that in order to rebut the presumption that
I. -iliggins, v. Jo}insbn' b-heirs, 'O Tex. -.89.
Smith v. Stirahan, 16 T. 614.
2. ifuston v. (1,ul, 8 T. &.
prorerty purchased durinp' marriage is coranunity property, where a
creditor is concerned, one of three things must be shown: (1)
that the funds with which the purchase was made were owned by the
claimant before the marriage, or, (2) were acquired by Lrift, devise
or descent, or (3) that said funds were the proceeds of property
thus owned or acquired.
B. T1r "W1TFTI'S TNT7,P7ST.
The wife's interest in the cormunity irorerty is held in
privity with the husband. The power of the husband over the com-
rnunity estate by estoppel is not less than that of a partner to
estop his firmn-.
The wife loses many of her civil rights by marriage.
tThe law", says 'h. -i. nehill in drington v. Mayfield, 5 T. '365,
"has deemed it sound policy and beneficial to her interests that
celtain onerous restrictions should be imposed upon her ability to
deal with her separate estate. And if it be shielded from her
voluntary dispositions a Portiori it would be protected agaiid~t
the debts, engagements or contracts of her husband, unless made for
the benefit of such estates or, under certain circumstances, for
the support of the wife and her family."
i. Panney '.. Mliller, 51 T. Th.;.
The disabilities under which the wife is ylaced are:
(i) She is divested of power of free disposition of her own rrol-
erty, unless joined in the conveyance by her husband, and acknow-
led,d before an officer that it was made with her ,;onsent.
(I-) er separate proleriy ib entirely inder the husband's manage-
ment and he also has rower to dispose of tle common stock of gains.
( 3) ,Tenerally she has no l ower to contract or be bound by contracts,
unless as the agent or through the assent of the husband. (Con-
f or
tracts for necessaries for Yerself and children, and the benefit
of her separate prorert, are excelted from tlhis rule. ) (4) She
cannot sue for her own effects, unless joined with her husband,
or on his failure, under the authority of the court. '
'Then the matrimonial union has continued for any consi-
derable period, the rresLuir'tion is strong that the prol erty be-
longs to the common stock of acquits and gains. There is there-
fore no presumption that prorerty in the possessioh of a conjugal
partnership belongs to te husband rather than to the wife,.,-
Tn the case of Hodge v. Donald b5 T 345, the court says:
The rule deducible from former decisions by which it is deteumined
whether a grant of land issued to a colonist was separate or corn-
munity rroperty is as follows: (I) Tf the surviving husband re-
1. wright v. hIa'vs 10 T 1'60.
j T 65o)6 T drington v. ayfiell.
feived the gi'ant by reason of such emigration, settlement and re-
sidence on his puirz as would under the law entitle him to it in-
dependent of his status as a married man at the date of his wife's
death, it was his selarate Iroprty. ( T) f the increased quan-
tity of land over- that to which a single man not the head of a I'-
family was entitled, was given to the surviving husband by reason
of the fact that at the date of the death of the wife he was then
a married man, T.hen it was community rroi erty, and the half inte , -
est of the wife subject to the debts of ihe connunity' would de-
scend to her children.
. Agent of Partnership .
A. IJTIAND Aq AG' NT.
The powers of the husband over the sel arate property of
the wife are somewhat similar to those vested in the husband under
the rules of equity jui ISTrudence, when iermitted and authorized
by his wife, to receive thle rents, issues and rrofits of estates
limited to hejr sole 'and sep arate Use.
The husband may therefore be her agent to make conticts
that will bind her selarate estate, but it is not to be presumed
that he is her ag7ent because he is her husband.' The agency must
be such in fact, and not a thing to be px'esumed because of the
relation of liusband and wife. Thus in te case of Fuirrh v. "fins-
ton oo T ,) i the courT, held, wtkere a husband makes improvements on
is wife's Lands with community funds -e is entitled to reimburse-
menrt to the share of the funds used.
Th ere community prorerty is assigned by the husband in
the name of Thie wife, he is the real contracting r-art, y, though ie
assumes to act merely as her ar;ent.7" Tinder the colonization laws
of Mexico, Coahuila and Texas a married woman was capable of re-
ceiving a concession of land by onerous title. Such a grant how-
ever was looked upon as community property ani the husband could
disrose of it in any mode not intended to defraud the wife.
P . WT AS A V'7NT.
The relationship between husband and wife is such that
she is often called upon to act as h is impliodly authorized agent,
even in The management of his own affairs; more especially may she
mana.re and ,ontrol heiP se] arate property during his absence.
The wife, however, to disrose of the community prolert y
must *ave tIhe assent either exrress or imrlied of the husband.
Thus in the case of Thomas v. Clhance i T 64, where certain com-
munity real estate h-ad stood in the name of tlie wife, and thea,
was a deed from the wife alone, the husban having secured the
Magee v. ,hite , T 180.
i ( T
purchase money.,the court held, that the sale was as valid as if
the deed had been made by the husband. A deed, made by a married
woman, of the community rroperty, without the concurrence of her
husband is entirely worthless. Tn Youngy v. Van 7enthuysen 50
T. '1o6, the court says; a deed made by a married woman for land,
even if the land had been her own, would not 1bave p'assed the title
unless it were acknowledged before a 'ror:er officer, according to
the statute in such cases made and yrovided.
3. T,IAITTTY OF PARTTR1F.
The commentators upon the laws of Spain 4nnounce the pro-
position that the community i roierty of the husband and wife is
chargeable with community debts, and the serarate property of each
with their i'esrective separate debts; and no doubt where there was
both common and separate prop erty, and common and separate debts,
the community pro-operty would be charneab)Le with the community
debts and the serarate estate with the separate debts.
,ut the court in Portis V. Parker T-. '. o99 says: 7e
are not satisfied that the conmmunity property was not liable by the
laws of Spain, for the separate debts of tlhe husband, where he had
no separate estate, inasmuch as we have not had an opportunity s!if-
ficientiy to explore it to ascertain satisfactorily its I rovisions.
Owing to lack of matel'ial T have been unable to verify the correct
ness of the above statement.
(,ommunity property is subject to the separate debts of
the husband, says the court in Tee v. }lenderson, i/) T. 190, under
the old law of Texas relating to husband and wife, wIich. is sub-
stantiaily r'e-enacted by Pev. qtat. Tex. tit. A)0. As a neneral
rule, it may be stated that 1the Ir.ivate property of each partner
in The matrimonial union must bear its own ch arges and expenses.
The surviving husband is personally liable for all com-
munity debts, and hence if he extinguish-es the community interest
in any ,iven article of rroperty, the proi'erty still continues li-
able to community crediTors. The survivin7 wife is not personally
liable for community debts, and hence whenever she extinguishes the
community interest in any given article of IroyerTy, that property
becomes absolutely hets./-
Tn Taylor v. Murplty, 50 T. 91, the court held that com-
munity property responds for a wife's antenuptial de!-ts after hAer
separate property has been exhausted.
4. N-FOSSARIES.
Th-e law imposes upon a husband the obtigation to supyort
I. Leatherwood v. Arnold, 66 T. 4 14 sc I S,! li35.
his wife and children. Tf there is no community property but i, he
husband has separate yroperty, such. I foperty can then be charged
for necessariesfor the surT.ort of '-is family.
"The law rermits", says Judre Pell, in ,lagee v. Tite
*2A T. 180, "the wife to contr-act for necessaries ror herself and
children and to incur expenses for the benefit of her separate
property; and her separate p roperTy is bound for such necessaries
and such exrenses. 7'ut she is under no legal obliation to sup-
port the husband, nor can her separate estate be chared even for
necessaries for him, notwithstandin- he may be insolvent".
In order to cliarge the separate property of the wife, on
general princiles of equity, for necessaries for the family, in
addition to the insolvency of the husband it must be alle,-ed and
shown that the rents, profits, and hire of the seplarate property
are insufficient to discharge the demand, The corrus of the sepma-
rate property of The wire should not be sacrificed excelt in case
of absolute necessity#
The exrense occasioned by the wife's necessaries should
be satisfied:
First, out of the comrion pros erty.
Secondly, out of the separate property of the husband
i. r1own v. ctor, 19 T. 364-.
Thirdly, out of t,e rents and' profits of the wife's separate prop-
erty.
Fourthly, out of the corpus of the wife's separ'ate property.
Tf a separation takes place between husband and wife,
without the fault of the latter, Ithe husband will of course be li-
able for necessaries furnisbed her, and Tis exIress prohibition
not to flrnish her with cer-zin ar icles is entitle-I to Little or
no weirh-,t.
It appears further that the wife would be entitled in
many instances, to necessaries, although the separation may have
been by Ier fault; as, for instance, where her separate property
is under her husband's control, or there is a sufficient amount of
commutni ty property.
If necessaries are suirnlied on the credit of the wife
and she has separate I roperty an-] means w erewith to pay the claim,
and this separate property is under her own control, with an income
amly sufficient to t'he sujji y of Ier wants, it would seem that
such debt could be satisfied out of tTe wife's se!arate proTeroy I -
1. B9ajk v. -Pryan, 18 T. 4J'.
T T Q!!' 0T TTTTOJN OTAI TIT- Pfi'T_?'P 11TTP.
TT'e conjuial paitnershil may be dissolvel in four ways:
(1) Death, natural or civil; ( ) Divorce; (;)) 0(Tharat ion of body;
(4) Seraration of p;roerty.
(I) Death.
The existence of the wife is not rner,e,I in that of the
husband. They are searate and distinct rersons, especially as
r'c-ards their estates and righ1ts of ]-rol, erty. "They are co-equals
in Life and at death, tlhe survivor, w},et,-r Tusband or wife, re-
mains th!e head of the family. "-'
The survivor can sell his or her undivided inTerest in
the community rrorerty, but if there are any children, such sur-
vivor cannot sell the interest of the deceased r-artner, except to
pay the community debts and the existence of such debts will not
be Fresumed. TT e husband as survivor of ti-e connubial partner-
ship 'has authority to fulfil all contracts, res]pecting the coilon
]roperty, entered into by himself alone or joinltly with the wife
before her death..'"
At the death of the Tusuand the surviving wife has the
right to retain tle '-omestead and oth-er I'rolerty which is exempted
from forced sale. This homestead right of the wife does not how-
I. Wood v. Wheelei 7 T 1;5.
r,. "rewer v. Wall Y,54 T .).
ever survive at her death, so as to vest a similar i'i ht in the
children of Tlhe marriae,, and if it be th e husband's sep arate prop-
erty he may sell it.
2. DIVORC71.
The court pronouncing a decree of divorce from the bond
of matrimony shall also decree and order a division of the estate
of the rarties in such way as to the court shali seem just and
right, having due cegard to the rights of each party, and their
children if any; jrovided however, that notling herein contained
shall be construed to comnpel either party to divest him or herself
of the title to real estateA.
As a general rule, says the learned judge in riitts v. Fhitts
14 T. 44;5, the separate pIroperty should be restored to its owner,
and such division of the community property may be made as may seem
just and riglht, having reference to the education and maintenance
of the children. Put in a proper case the separate property may
be placed in the hands of a trustee, and its rents etc. paid i,
the husband, wife and children in such proportion as the court may
direct.
VyWhere the circcumstances require it the commnuiity property
may also be placed in the hands of a trustee.
1. Sayle's Civil Stat. , of Texas, Art. 2864.
On t'he dissolution of marriage by divorce, comnunity
property must satisfy community debts incurred before the insti-
tution or tl',e divorce suit 7/.
On and after the day on which the action for divorce
shall be brou-T-t, it shall not be lawful for the 'h-sband to con-
tract any debts on account of the comnunity, nor to dispose of the
lands belonging to the same; and any alienation made by him after
that time shall be null and void, if it be proved to the satisfac-
tion of the court that such alienation was made with a fraudulent
view of injuring tho rights of the wife,.
3. SFPARATION OF BODY.
The only difference between the rights of the husband
and wife in respect to property acquired during coverture is, that
he has the management and control of it for the benefit of both.
In all other respects their rights are precisely equivalent.
Thiere the husband is absent from home, and leaves no one
to take care of the common property, the wife acquires a right,
rather, has the implied authocity to manage,control and dispose
of the community proT~erty, as woel as hei' separate prolerty<!.
1. Richey v. I-Iarg 41 T. 3,56.
Sayle's 2ivil Stats. Tex. Art. 28b7.
Cheek v. Bellows, 17 T. t316.
"Iler passive rights are quickened into vigorous activity by the
desertion of hier husband". ALl 'her rights in and to the cornmun-
ity property are made the same as if bo were I id" '
This authority Piven to the wife is basel on sound r ,.son
and equity, and it is oftentimes necessary for the preservation
of the community property and the supp~ort of thie wife and children.
When -the wife makes contracts under such circumstances as give her
this impliel authority, a privy examination is not essential to
give them effect. She may prove and acknowledge them in the same
manner as those of a feme Sole.
It has been hel.d that the period of abandonment is not
material except in evidence, to show that the absence is not tem-
porary in its nature.
If the husband becomes insane, his wife becomes the head
of the famiLy, and has a perfect legal right to dispose of so much
of the community property, or if thiere is none, then so much of the
husband's separate property as may be necessary to the support of
herself and children. She is liable, however, on the husband's
recovering his faculties, for all property that has been unneces-
sarily squandered1.
I. ruiiers v. James, (DO T. 494.
2. Forbes v. Moore, 3?. T. 196.
Wfhere the wife without good cause voluntarily abandoned
her husband for several years, the court in 7'arle v. arle 9 T. 6.0
held that sle forfeited her claim to the homestead and widlow's
allowance.
6. SEPAPAT7, PPOP. PTY OF THE WTF*,.
All property, both real and personal, of the husband,
owned or claimed by him before marriage, and that acquired after-
ward by gift, devise or descent, as also the increase of all lands
Thus acquired shall be his separate rrorerty. All property, both
real and personal, of The wife, owned or claimed by 'her before
marriage, and that acquired afterward by gift, devise or descent,
as also the increase of all lands thus acquired, shall be .he
separate property of the wife; but durinp- the marriage the husband
shall have the sole management of all such Property-.
T'e capacity of the wife to hold propoerty in her own
right, separate and apart from her husband is as complete and per-
fect as that of the husband to hold property in his own right, sep-
arate and apart from his wife. There is not the slightest di'-
ference in this particular between their civil rights and capaci-
ties.
I. Sayle's div. Stat. of Tex., Art. 28jI.
"The principles and rules of the common law", says the
learned judge, in 7drin ton v. .Tayfield, b T. 366, "as to the ef-
y
f'ect of coverture, so far as theAaffect the capacity of the wife
to hold rroperty in her separate right, are totally expunged from
our, code of jurisrrudence and in an investigation of thle righL6
of the wife must be altogether discarded ftrom consideration".
The statutory estate granted to a wife by our laws, is
also entirely different from the equitable estate limited to the
sole and separate use of married women in 7ngland, for the very
object of this latter system is to prevent the husband from con-
trolling and managing the estate.
Our laws, on the contrary, give to the husband the sole
management and entire proceeds of the wife's separate estate during
the marriage. He, however, is compelled to support the wife and
children, and on his failing to do this the wife may complain to
the court, whereupon it is in the power of the court to decree that
so much of such proceeds shall be paid to the wife as the court
deems necessary. The court, therefore, even when applied to, only
takes conti-ol of so much of the proceeds, of the wife's separate
property as the necessities of the case may require.
Under the laws of 'Spain, in force in Texas pr ior to the
year 1840, the wife, notwitlhstanding her separate estate, could not
exercise many civil rights. As a general proposition, she couid
not make contracts, without the consent of her husband, and she was
especially I-rohibited from becoming .is secturity. "This disabil-
ity to become security, with certain exceptions not necessary to
11
be noticed", says FebAero (vol. 2 rrI. 42k, to2,), "was an immunity
to
conrion to the sex and applicable to feme sole as well as~mar'ried
it
womenjf.
The Act of 1840, however, has added considerable to the
civil rights of the wife, and by aufmenting the amount of commun-
ity property, has diminished the amount belonging to the parties
in their separate rights.
"Tven where the forms of law are all complied with", says
Judge 1emphill in Ilollis v. Wrancois, J T. 195, "the courts will,
examine with vigilance transactions in which the wife disposes of
or charges her separate property, and protect from undue influence
or the fraud or compulsion of her husband and others; but such
fraud etc. must be averred by the wife, and be sustained by proof".
Our statutes have now provided a special mode for the
conveyance of the wife's separate property. Th-is is a privy ex-
amination apart from her husband, and unless this is done, the wifre
has no power to chare her separate estate, except for necess.ies
1. ~Cartwright v. Iollis, 5 T. 132.
for herself and family, and for expenses incurred for the benefit
of her separate prop erty.
The separate IlroTcrty of the wife is liable for her debts
contracted before marriage#4, and it seems it is also liable to
respond in damages for the frauds in which sl-le participates in re-
lation to her own rroperty, and which inures to her exclusive ben-
efit-. Some cases make a distinction by exempting the separate
estate of the wife from liability because credit is given to the
husband and not to the wife. This, however, is entitled to no
credit, and is of no weight.
The wife's separate estate can only be made liable for
improvements thereon when authorized by her. That is, the debt
must be contracted by the wife herself or by her authority#.
'When a judgement is rendered on a debt of the wife, it
may direct the execution to be levied on the community property,
or her separate property, at the option of the plaintiff .
The law creates a presumption that all property holden
by husband or wife is community property, but this presumption as
I. Callahan v. Patterson, 4 T. 61.
2. Howard v. North, 5 T. 28 ,.
3. Warren v. Smith, 44 T. .,45.
4. !rant v. IVhittlesey, 42 T. 3 O.
between themselves and those claiming under them with notice, may
be rebutted 1y p roof that the pu. .ase was made with the separate
funds of either party.
The rights by which the husband and wife hold their prop-
erty respectively, are perfectly equal, and there is no more gi.ound
for the admission of the unauthorized declarationsof the husband
to the wife's detriment than for the admission of those of the lat-
ter to the injury of the former. "The admission of the decla-
ration of the husband", says the court in Mc~ay v. Treadwell 8 9.
176, "in prejudice of the righ1ts of the wife to her separate prol-
erty would contravene the spirit and object of the constitution
and laws by which.her separate rights are guaranteed, unless they
be made in case where he is constituted by law her virtual a>ent,
or where authority from her may be inferred".
A husband may make a gift-or grant of the community or
his separate prorerty to This wife by conveyance directly to her
and if a deed be 7iven by the husband to the wife, purporting to be
for a valuable consideration, if it is iven without fraud, and
there is virtually no consideration, it will be upheld as a dona-
tion or gift7'.
Tf real property be purchased in part with the community
1. Story v. Marshail, 24 T. 3Ou.
funds of husband anI wife, and in part with the wife's separate
funds, t}he wife becomes a tenant in common of tile land with her
husband, T er interest beinu proportionate to her investment t/.
So far as the Law may hitve placed the separate prop erty
of the wi l'e in her husband's contr-ol, shie has a tac it rnortga7e.
She virtually has a mortraLe uron the corrunity prop-erty to the
extent of her sep<arate estate.
(A). ARITNIS OF THE WITF'S S7,PAPATrI 7STATP.
II was at one time a very doubtful rroposition whether
crops grown upon the lands of' the wife, by the labor of her slaves
(before the war), or now by labor hired by herself, are the common
property of the husband and wife, and subject to an execution upon
a judgement aoainst the husband.
The idea that such crops belonged to the wife as her
sepiarate property, was based upon the etymolo,-ical sense of th}e
phrase "increase of land" used in the Act of 1848, "better definin-I
the marital rights".
This view of tlhe case, however, was never adopted for
i. Euilis v. IKoyes, II S.W.
Claibourne v. Tanner, 18 T. 68.
such an inter-pretation of the statute would have led to results
"inequitable and unreasonable and wholly inconsistent with, the
recognized principles of law upon which the system of comnunity
p-roperty is based--that whatever, is acquired by the joint efforts
of the husband arid wife shall be their community properT.
"Tt is tr'ue, " remarks Judge Bell in Deflanc v. lynch
23 T 2b, "in a particular case, satisfactory proof might be made
that the wife contiibuted nothing to the acquisitions; or on the
other hand that thje proer ty was wholly acquiired by ber industry;
but, from the very nature of Lhe inarria7e relation, the law can-
not permit inquiries into such matters. It conclusively presmes
that whatever is acquired, except by gift, devise , or descent, or
by the exchange of one kind of property for another' kind, is ac-
quired by their mutual industry."
Thus it was held in the case of White v. Lynch '2,6 T 19)
that, lumber- sawed at the mrill which was the separate rroperTy of
the wife, by the labor of slaves also her serarate rroperty, and
out of timber T'I'oCured from land which likewise was her separate
property is nevertheless the property of the community, and not
te seyar& te rop]erty of the wife.
In Claflin v. Pfeifer ii ! 1"T 486 (Tex) the court held
as a fundamental prorosition that profits on investments of a wife's
separate estate are community property and liible for' the husband',
debts. Th-'efore if th-e Irofits should in any manner become
mixed with the wife's separate esthte, in a contest between the
wife and the husband's creditor, the burden is on the wife to show
how much of it retained the char-acter of seraratce estate, or if
any part of it has undeirgone mutations to trace and identify it.4'
The wife's earninns unless given her by her husband, and
likewise property bought with such earnings, belong to the commu-
nity,# and a very interesting case reported in 'I? T 359 (Dixon v.
Sanderson), holds thiat money, received as a rrize on a lottery
ticket purchased with the separate rfroierty of the wife, is com-
munity Irop.erty, not being acquired by either husband or wife by i
gift, devise or descent.
'/ . VOW gTTTT PPO)TTIiT FOP PT.TTh'TT OF VITFI •
At common law, as the wife had no separate legal exist-
ence, suits in relation to her rights had to be brought in the
joint names of husband and wife. The husband however coul- sue
I
alone for such property of the wif'e, as he could dispose of for
his own use.
Tf a suit had to be brought in equity in order to recov-
1. qee also ,]ones v. -7rperson o.) T 4 ?).
2. Fisk v. Plores 45 T ' 40; ,Johnson v. Tuford 5J T 1dZ.
er tIe wife's pro]erty, although when re:covered it might vest in
t' . husband, yvet t]he wife must be joined so thiat she may olect
that the irroi.erty shall go to v.r husband, or in order that the
court may make a Frovision for her.
If the suit is brought in regard to the wife's separate
eslate, she alone has the rig ht to brin t'he action and suit is
brou;-I4t in the name of her rTrochein ami.
Our system of Jurislrtdence recognizes none of the pre-
ceding distinctions. The wife's right to her own property, under
our Laws, cannot be affected in the slih'test byl the circumstaile
of the joinder of the husband for its recovery,. In the words of
Oh. J. I-emrhill in Cannon v. ITemphill 7 T 184, "let it be recov-
ered by whom and how it may, it remains unchanged the absolute
prope"rty of the wife."
By qec. 9 Act 1840 (Art 415 ,iv. qtats of Tex), it is
declared that the husband may sue, either, alone or jointly wit.
his wife, for the recove)-y of any effects of the wif,. The law
thus give-s him an ottion in the manner of brining the suit. The
husband in this particular is the authorized agent or' attorney of
his wife, and all his acts are binding on his i-rinci pal, if done
I
in Jrood faith. If the husband is incomyetent or negligenT in
taking care of her rights, the court will doubtless interfere for
h,,r prot(.ection.
She also may impeach any decree obtained by the husband,
while acting in thois capacity,, tl-routrh fraud or collusion, and if
she does so th husband should he made defendant and not a co-
Tlaintiff with his wife.
8. WITF v ' AS A Mn'RCIIANT.
The wife may become a merchant but she must conduct the
business with her serarate 1prop'erty, and slhe can under no ciru.4m-
stances invest the community esta.e or buy goods on the credit of
the husband. She virtually cannot purclbase on crodit but must
buy for cash only and she must at all times be 'ready to show That
the money used in her business belongs to her serarate means.
Ahen a woman marries all business partneiships which
existed between herself and another rrior -.o that time are at once
dissolved for after marriage she can form no partnership for The
transaction of' business, whi,,Ih the Law cun recognize, either with
h er husband or the former partner.1+
9. PI TTArTV7' MARPTArl,- , S.
A tnarri,-ge duly solemnized in Texas wl ile subject to the
laws of Mexico, Tllolgv the husband migh.t have had a former wife
i. Prown v. Chancellor ol T 4Yi.
living imlposed upon the second wife, if ignorant of this fact, all
the obligations and invested h, r with all the rights of a lawful
wife, so long as this ignorance continued.
"According to the system of Spanish jurisrrudence, " says
the learned judge in Smithi v. Smitl 1 T o21, "a putative is con-
verted into a real marriage by the removal of the disability,
h-owever that may b- effected. ITnder tTiat system of laws a mar-
riage contractrd in grood fait'- by both or one of the parties, and
afterwards annulled on account of some existing impediment, pro-
duces nevertheless the civil effects of truue matrimony in favor
of the innocent spouse, as well as the offspring of such marriae.'
Tn the case of Babb v. Carroll I T 'loo, where a man and
woman emigrated to Texas in 186j, and from that time to the death
of the man in 18,7, lived and cohabited togethen' and passed them-
selves, and were reported as husband and wife, the courT. held,
that lands acquired by th]e husband as a colonist, are community
property between them to the exclusion of a wife elsewhiere.
Under a statute in force in Texas in 18:57 the surviving
husband or wife could not inherit as heir of the deceased but if
the widow lad not sufficient means to live with the comforts to w_,
which she was accustomed, she was entitled to wl-at was termed the
marital fourth of the estate of -0,e deceased husband. Upon mar-
rying again, owever, she forfeited this right.
If married persons should move from a state or foreign
country into a state wher'e the community system exists, their'
subsequently acquire- pro] erty is subject to the community of
A
acquets and gains.!1  Come jurists in France and Holland. doubt
the correctness of the above prolosition, and hold that the
community system prevails and follows the Jproerty even sub-
sequently acquired after a chlange of domicile, on the grouril of
a tacit or implied contract having the effect of an actual mar-
riage settlement. Such reasoning however has for its basis
thr comity of nations and this always yields to the authority
of positive legislation.
10. D"RS"(" TT OF COMMUITT1TTY PROPPTY.
TTpon the dissolution of the marriage relation by death,
all l roperty belonging to the community estate of the husband
and wife shall go to the survivor, if there be no child or
chitdren of the deceased or their descendants; but if there be
a child or children of the deceased, or descendants of such
child or children, then the survivor shall be entitled to one-
half (1/2) of said prorerty, and the other half shall pass to
I. Gale v. Davis 4 Martin's 'Re645 (La);
Saul v. His Creditors 17 Martin's Re, ;)69 (La).
su(h chiLd or children or thteir descenwits. But such descen-
dants shall inherit only sucli portion of said pro]perty.as-, tho
par'ent thilough whom they inherit would be entitled to if alive.-
The term uhild or children in the above article has been
held to refer only to descendants in the first dree. Tii..e'e-
fore if a husband or wife dies leaving grandchildren but no
children, the entire community estate lasses to the surviving
spouse.#
A surviving husband is entitled to a life estate in one-
third (/,) of lands which were the separate property of his
deceased wife, which corresi onds to tle husband's curtesy at
common law. This life estate, Yowever, never attached to the
deceased wife's moiety of the community lands.
In every e.ase the community estate passes charged with
tlhe debts against it, (Art 1I64 Stats.), and the survivor may
make arpliuation to the county court to have partition of the
estate whereupaon thle same r'ules and regulations aptly as in
partition and distribution of other ,-states.L'
On the death of the h-usband or- wife the survivor may pay
i. Art. litj; Sayle's Civ. Stats. Texas.
Burgess v. Hargrove (4 T 110;
.artwriht v. Moore oo T o.
;5. Art. 2iSL Tats.
romrrjuity debts and roi' Olat r:uryose may sell the entire com-
muni ty proper iy i c I lug]iY th e homestead and othe r exomlt r'oP-
er y. 1le 1 as tlo entire management ar)d control of T,he comrnun-
ity estate, and if he pays the debt. of -uch esthete with his
separate means, he may reimburse himself by an approlriation of
coM1unity i roperty.
"Th1,e survivor", says Judge Robertson, "becornes a ten1ant
in coiarnon with the h eirs of the decedent, of the comanunity pror-
erty,rand isd not rest onsible to them for its use or- hire so Ion.-
as he does no act T reventing the other" tenants in common fr-om
like occupation and use."
ITe is virtually a trustee but unlike other trustees,
while the object to be accoinT lished !)y hiim i-s prescribed by law
yet the means of attainin,7 it are not srecified. lie also can-
ao be reluired to account for he is vested with domplete power
and discretion in the administration of the estate.
The survivor is entitled of his own right to one half
(i/2) of the estate, and when he qualifies under the statute
he virtually becomes the managing rartner of tihe entire estate.
"W' eev he has done well or ill", says the learned judge in
Leat T erwood v. Arnoldl t6 T. 414, "depends not on any particular
act, but on the geneyral result. le is debited ,:ith the value
of the estate and its revenues, and credited with disbursements,
and must account to crediters and distributes for the remainde.0r
The ri)tt to tlie eitire control of' the estate by the survivor
may be terminated at any time by the gyrant oPf administiratio L
thei-eon, or" by proceedin-s for part ition and distribution.
The creditor' may have his suit and jud;er,,;nt against the
survivor and execution against the community Iror er'ty under such
jud , , ment. Tie need never plroceed in equity or require an
accounting, and whatever remedy he selects his right to have his
charge upon t]he t*rust estate satisfied, remains The same.
Whiere the -,usband or wife dies intestate, leaving no
child or children and no selarate y roT erty, the conmunity prop-
er-y passes to ile survivor charged with the debts of the com-
muity, and no administration thereon is required.
Where the wife dies leaving a sur"viving husband and a
cTild or c'ildren, th:e surviving husband shall have ilhe exclu-
sive management, control and disposition of the community i rop-
erty after hier death, in the same manner as during I-er lifetime.
This right, however, is subject to certain statutory provisions.
The surviving Iusband, must within four years after the
death of his wife, when there is a child or children, file a
written application in tle county court of TI}e proper county
s tat ing: -
(l Te 1',C of h-is wife t-h, 1.te time and place of her death.
() Ttat; shie left a chiill or c h ill en surviving her, -ivin,-
the name, residence a -ae oC' each child.
(15) That there is a corrunity estate between his ]eceased wife
and h-,imself.
(4) Such facts as show the jurisdiu tion of the court over ;Jie
estate.
(5) Asking for the aji ointment of apiraisers to a l-raise each
estate.
WhPen such writteii ap :lication is made thec court appoints
appraisers, wlho, with the surviving husband make out an inven-
tory of said community estate, and attach thereto all com runity
debts, said inventory be ing returnal)ie to The court in twenty
(20) days. The surviving husband must also qualify with a bond
with two sureties equal to the whole value of the community
estate.
The court then examines the inventory, bond, etc. and
apyroves or disapproves them by an order. Tflten a favoraeol,
order is rec;eived by the couri the survivor bias control of the
property as a trustee and not as an administrator. lIe acts
indelendently of the orders of the Probate coarI,, and the exer-
cise of his discretion is under no judicial warrant or control
as in c: aS , s\of ord inary a<inistrati on.
rIle sUrvivor must keel a fair and f.utll ac cout of his
manageme.nt of the uoymunity estate, and it is his duty to pa-y
all debts accordirip to t,',e classir(ication and in t'Ie order ,e-
scribed for the p>ayment of Th] e debts in other administrations.
The survivin", wife may r-etain t]-e exc lusive mana eoment,
control and dibjosition of the community prolerty of hersetf and
her deceael husband in the same manner and subject to the same
ri-]As rules and regulations as T-rovided in tl e case of a sur-
viving husband, -nitil she may marry again. Upon tj e marriage
of the surviving; wife shie shall cease to have such control and
management of said estate, or the ri$ht to disiose of the same,
and said estate shall be subject to administration as in other
cases of deceased Terson's estates.
After a lapse of twelve months fi-om the filing, of the
bond by ti e survivor, the Tersons entitled to t] e dec,)ased's
share of such community estate, or any 1 ortion thereof, shall b,,
entitled to demand and have a yartition and distribution there-
of in the same manner as in other administrations#!.
The homestead rights of the widow and children of deceas-
ed aree the same whetlher tT e homestead be !The se>pirvite 1 roert.y
1. Civ. Stats. Tex. Arts. Iu-ZISl5 inclusive.
oC the deceased or corrrunity Tr]:'o!"erty between ty-e widow and the
deceased, and Oe rasreoctive inter,'sts of sucfi widow anl cOil-
dren sh-ll b 1Ite same in T. le one case as in the other. (Art.
2006, Civ. Stats. Tex.)
11 A LTADIUP Q T'STION.
Suplose land which is conmuiity property is conveyed by
the husband at the death of 1bi6 wife, ,o an innocent, third
parny. Are th e clhildren oF the deceased wiffe entitled to re-
cover their share of the property even from the innocent third
party, and if so what must such a bona fide holder show in order
to throw the bur(3en of proof on the heirs in impcaclhing, the con-
veyance?
The court in the prevailineT opinion in Yancy v. ,atte
-- T. 46 hois; if J be land iU p roved to be comunity property,
the children of the deceased wife are entitled to recover unless
some equitabLe defense was made. TI tie case of ,]olnnson v.
Harrison 4F T. )7 th e same judqe writing the prevailing opin-
ion as in the preceding; case, lays down the doctrine that, uh,
existence of a community obii~ation being, sown tie burden of
proof, in impeacllini7 t]e conveyance made in discoa ' of that
obli ;,ation is pro'ojrly I-laced on the heir. --ut the implied
concl',s ioni is tAt until .uc-i (;OmrfnUlity obli,-,ation or some ot}Ter'
equity is esiahl)i.0ed, 1,-11 'ig it of the heir IrevaiVs.
',7Fat Then rL)e tlqe -quitable defense.s vhic , tl,- hioller' ol'
the property mst estabtish? T 41ese av  been held to be a-,
follows: (I) Th at tT;ere were de bts j±.,rinst t~e 1 omorn iU y
estate of s-uch vendor and his former wife, when he sold the
land. . That such sale was made with the ioeOsT, purpOse
of Isaying such debts, and TThat the vendor had justly accouited
to his deceased wil'e's children for all theii interest in tive
,onmruJity estate.
Justice Moore in a very learned orinion in the case of
Yancy v. :Tatte, dissents from the holding of the court. ]1is
objection, briefly summarized are as follows:
(i The legal title being in the husband hie passes by deed
the le:al title to the I-ur'uh]iser, an d thIe burden of proof is
upon the Teirs to show that t}e vendee i6 not an innocent pur-
chaser.
(5) Tf the purcaser sl-ows that lie is a holder for value f'rom
tT' party a::'arentlv holding the legal title, and t}lat pnrty has
authority to sell, if -the purclhaser H-as no notice of the rights
of the heirs of the wife, his equity is superior to that of the
heirs, and they are !-ot entitled to a retovery.
(13) Suc}l a dec ision, "can but be a fountain of fraud :ind per-
jury, poisoning the minds of ch ildren, inculcating lessons of
selfish distr-ust and disrespec-t in Ilace of rverence, filial
affection and domestic harmony", and furtherniore it will cast a
ur on
cloud , almost every title to land in th State.
(4) At-,orneys, uider such a decision, cannot vith even very
diligent inquiry and examination, say that a title is unques-
tionably perfect, and therefore they cannot advise a client
that !he may purchase without dan,,oer.
As to the question of equitable defensos, Judge :ioore
remarks: "A purchaser cannot possibly know what debts exist
against tle commnunity. TTo only source to Which he could apply
for information is th e husband himself. Tiow it is well settled
that where a trustee has authority to sell for the payment of
debts generally an innocent purch aser is not to suffer th rough
abuse of his trust, by seiling when it is unnecess ry; nor
though he makes an improrer arlropriation of the Iurchase money'
The law on the subject of the rights of the surviving
husband in the comrrunity proerty is doubtless at variance i
the habits and modes of thoug{ht of the lr e body of the peeple
of the state. But in the words of Judge Gould, "Wie doctrine"
as laid down in the prevailing opinion, "has been recognized
Iom so early a p-eriod, and in so many cases, that we do not
r e aird it as ope n to conitrover vy".
There is no rule !.o1',re vital, more {w-r]amentl, tlan that
which requires ad'herence to de, i,ions. 'lie disregrard of that
rule, es. ecially in matters affectin7 titles to land leads o
most injurious r'emults, and can only be justified by "reasons
most uxi ,eint and upon a clear manifestation of' error". (Ient
Comm. 4/). Therefore if the error be in the law, t]le proper
remely is only to be sought in legislative action.
Co' 0IJTS I OI.
T have placed before you thc essentials of what is known
as the iorrmunity System. Tt. is midway between the common law
and Ile civil law, and possesses many of the merits of each.
Thje great defect in the 6ystem, as it appears to me is,
that th e husband has absolute control of the wife's property.
]He rray during his mana rement ] lace it in s h a condition that
it will be almost impossible to trace it th}7rough its different
mutations, and show conclusively that it is the separate Irop-
erty of the wife.
The wife, however, may have her separate proTerty reg-
istered. This airrears to me to be the only remedy. Tf the
law should compel the wife at or berore marriage, and subse-
quent.ly wben sl)w acqu r-u selarate rroielty to r'2§isTer it, tY'e
;,reaz evil aj'isinr t]xoupI} th, eI banrl's innoroi;n or fi-audulent
mismana-rement wilL have ieen obviate4.
As a whole, the system embraces te true ideas of conju-
'U L re l-Itionship. TIt makes ]usband and wife absolute e-o-equals
and allows thern to ,-diare as equal Tarnets in the profits and
gains of their married life.
A.TF OF CAS2',S CITED.
,abb v. Cu..rro[L
Black v. 7ryan
2,,ewer v. Wal1
Y'rown V. C-ancellor
'3rown V. .ct-tO
Bulli v. Noyes
Burgess V. ITarrove
Ca',lalban v. Patterson
,annonV. Iem'Tii
Cartwri:t V. ilolli5
Cartwr'i 4 L-t v. fUoore
'Thcek v. Bellows
CLafiin v. Pfeifer
Claibourne v. Tanner
Culles V. Jaes
De-lanc v. Tyncl,
Dixon v. Sander'son
Farle v. Farle
,drinrton v. 'Jafield
Fisk v. Flores
Fitts v. oitos
jiorbes V. M',oore
21 T. 765
18 T. 4356
26 T. 5 8,j
L:1 T. 46Y
19 T. 34/
11 S.W. (Cal)
t4 T. 110
4 T. 61
7 T. 184
3 T. 152
66 T. 55
1V T. 613
11 S.71. 483
L8 T. 68
o T. 494
*:5 T. 2.i
YJ . 59
5 T. 5uo
46 T. 340
14 T. 44,
62 T. 196
Fuirr'l V. WVilson
'aic v. D]avis
4rvant V. wU ittlosey
]hai'twell v. Jackson
Ifigi ins v. Jo}insor' s T eirs
Irodge v. Donald
hollis v. 1'rancois
Ifowai'I V. Noivtl
iluston V. Curl
Johnson v. P uford
,]oh2nson v. Yarrison
Jones v. ,,pei-son
Leatlicrwood v. Arnold
Lee v. Henderson
1abry v. irarri son
MfaFeo v. White
McKay v. Treadwell
HiTchell v. Marr
Portis v. Par'ker
Panney v. Mil1ei
Richoy v. iaare
Saul v. His creditors
Smith v. Smit>-I
(, 6 T . --),
4 1Vas"tin'V - Pi  r. ,,4T, (La.)
49, . :51,10
'i T. 5,/o
,0 T. ;589
.5,j T. 34,
8j T. 19j
• $ T. 414,89
1 T. 19
44 T .
48 T . '3
61i) T,. 4 5
66 T. 414
8i 3 T. 1i9
44 T . -', 1 (R'
!r)3 'T. 180
8 T. 173
41 T. 660
17 M1artin's Pei. 2169 (La.)
I T. 13 {I
£ynitll v. trahTa
ctory v. Mlars]iall
Taylor V. 1,Ur i1y
Thomas v. gml7ance
V;arr'en v. Smith
"Ihite v. lycl
Wood v. 7,lieler
Wrig)ht v. Hays
Yancy v. 7atte
Youang v. Van Benthuysen
w4 T. 60
30 1'. ?,91
11 T. 6 3,4
44 T. V4J
'-,6 T. 19i3
IT. 135
10 T1. i 0
48 T. 4;
'50 T. 7 6

